Boston Finance News – Downsizing Big Banks

Boston Money — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 15:17:25 +0000

Downsizing the big banks: A long-term solution

James Cullen

The hundreds of billions in rescue funds needed to support banks — and the trillions in implicit subsidies — has brought the question of appropriate institutional size to the forefront of regulatory reform. Not surprisingly, FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke favor measures collectively intended to limit the size of banks in the future, Bloomberg News reports.

Options include raising capital ratios as a bank increases in size, accelerating the increases in fees paid to the FDIC, and lowering the cap on the percentage of nationwide deposits any one bank can take. Overall, the goal is to have “financial disincentives for size and complexity,” according to Bair. Complexity encompasses untraditional banking activities, such as the proprietary trading that drove Goldman Sachs’ (GS) hugely profitable quarter, as well as investing in structured financial products.

There’s no doubt that the majority of large banks took on more risk than they could handle during the last few years. Scale can be helpful in banking, but it can also mean that improper activities are occurring because management’s oversight is less effective. A trillion dollar-plus balance sheet can hide a lot of bad assets and hidden risks. As the too-big-to-fail debate rages on, the real goal is how to avoid a bank that is too-big-to-rescue.

If it seems absurd that the current raft of bailout programs could need to be repeated one day in such a larger size as to be impossible for the U.S. government to finance, consider what’s happening in the financial system now. As certain banks go under (like Washington Mutual) and others are absorbed (like Wachovia) — the result is greater concentration of banking assets under the survivors. I’ve argued elsewhere that this is both a natural and healthy part of market cycles. However, if the government is implicitly supporting existing large banks — keeping them around in the hopes that they can help clean up the mess by taking over other failed institutions — then all bets are off.

The current working plan of regulators and the Treasury Department is to increase concentration in the banking system, but it’s a near-term patch job and the exact opposite of what’s necessary long-term. Promoting stability means promoting an environment where the failure of one does not lead to a potential failure of all, and that’s tough to do when the top handful of financial institutions have huge balance sheets and extensive counterparty entanglements with each other. If that means creating a well-defined line between the dealings of regulated banks and unregulated investment banks or hedge funds, then that discussion should be on the table.

Luckily, America hasn’t yet been confronted with a financial crisis “fix” that exceeds its capacity to borrow. But to ensure that doesn’t happen in the future, institutions need to be appropriately sized so that they aren’t crucial enough to create the hope for financial help when times get tough.

James Cullen edits and writes at CollegeAnalysts.com. He is the vice president of the Boston College Investment Club, which owns shares of GS, but he has no personal position in the stocks mentioned above.

Boston Finance – Throwing Keys to Fed Risky

Boston Money — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 22:57:23 +0000

MARK T. WILLIAMS

Don’t throw the keys to the Fed

By Mark T. Williams | July 2, 2009

THE OBAMA administration’s plan to close the existing regulatory gap by using the Federal Reserve Bank as the main systemic-risk regulator is theoretically sound but a bad idea under existing Fed structure.

The Fed employs thousands of examiners stretching from Boston to San Francisco in an attempt to ensure a safe and sound banking system. They are the first line of defense in our banking system, ideally providing a financial firewall against excessive risk taking by physically inspecting banks and ensuring that adequate capital is available to support risk activities. Ratings provide a health scorecard and a comparison with peer institutions.

Although Fed examiners scored major banks such as Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, why didn’t they pick up on the bad banking behavior that President Obama characterized as “wild risk taking’’ on Wall Street? This trend should have been discovered, except that the Fed is adverse to change and its examiners are way behind the regulatory curve.

If the financial market was a gun fight, the Fed would be carrying pea shooters while the Wall Street structured-product gurus would be carrying AK-47s. The sophistication gap facing those charged with measuring and protecting our financial system is staggering.

Meantime, the corporate culture at the Fed has made examiners second-class citizens compared with the more glamorous monetary policy geeks and the economists who roam the marbled hallways. Of the 12 sitting Fed presidents, none came up through the ranks from examiner. Fed examiners continue to have a limited advancement track and salaries at least one-fifth less than those of the people who create the derivatives on Wall Street. How can the Fed attract the best and brightest this way?

The Obama plan would give more responsibility to the Fed at a time when it hasn’t earned it. The recent banking debacle makes clear the Fed has failed to demonstrate that it is capable of taking this added responsibility. Handing the Fed this new duty, given its recent track record, is the equivalent of giving your teenager a new car right after he wrecked the last one. This significant sophistication gap at the Fed, compared with market counterparts it is charged with regulating, is why the Fed didn’t detect the growing risk taking by the major banks. Examiners did not have the adequate training, skills, or tools needed to go head-to-head with the Wall Street rocket scientists.

Why, for example, didn’t the Fed examiners see the growing threat of derivatives? These financial products that got so many banks in trouble were first concocted in the financial laboratories of First Boston and Salomon Brothers back in 1983. The Fed should have had time to amass an understanding of how such derivatives worked, and what kind of financial damage they could cause if used in excess or for the wrong purpose.

But under its current charter, the Fed is not held accountable for a job poorly done. In response to the current banking debacle, there have been no penalties, demotions, firings, or even a public hearing on how and why the Fed dropped the ball. Moreover, when banks do fail (approximately 40 so far this year), it’s the FDIC, not the Fed, that must clean up the mess.

Before the Obama administration expands the Fed’s role and throws it the keys, it is important to fix the varsity-versus-jayvee vulnerability at the Fed. At minimum, this will require that more capital (human and financial) be committed to specialized hiring, training, and increased use of state-of-the-art risk-measurement tools (e.g., computer modeling). The goal is to improve the use of risk-focused exams and to create a skilled examination staff that can detect and halt wild risk taking before the company, market participants, and the economy are harmed.

In addition to the Fed being held more accountable, there must be implementation of performance-based incentives for a job well done. Equally, there needs to be clear consequences to the Fed for poor performance. Only after we plug this regulatory sophistication gap at the Fed can confidence in this agency be restored.

Mark T. Williams, a former Federal Reserve Bank examiner, teaches finance at the Boston University School of Management.

Boston Financial News | Boston Finance » FDIC

Boston Finance News – Downsizing Big Banks

Downsizing the big banks: A long-term solution

Boston Finance – Throwing Keys to Fed Risky

Don’t throw the keys to the Fed